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We try to better understand the comparative advantages of structural and behavioral measures of 
deregulation in electricity markets, an eminent policy issue for which the experimental evidence is 
scant and problematic. In the present paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the effects 
of the introduction of a forward market on competition in electricity markets. We compare this 
scenario with the best alternative, reducing concentration by adding one more competitor by 
divestiture. Our work contributes to the literature by introducing more realistic cost configurations, 
teasing apart number and asset effect, and studying numbers of competitors that reflect better the 
market concentration in the European electricity industries. Our experimental data suggest that 
introducing a forward market has a positive effect on the aggregate supply in markets with two or 
three major competitors, configurations typical for both the newly accessed and the old European 
Union member states. Introducing a forward market also increases efficiency. Our data furthermore 
suggest, in contrast to previous findings, that the effects of introducing a forward market is stronger 
than adding one more competitor both in markets with two, and particularly three, producers. Our data 
thus suggest that the behavioral measure of introducing a forward market is more effective than the 
structural measure of adding one more competitor by divestiture. Thus competition authorities should, 
in line with EU law, focus on the behavioral measure of introducing, or at least facilitating the 
emergence of, forward markets rather than on the structural measure of lowering market concentration 
by divestiture. 
Keywords 




Concentration in generator markets is a key problem in the EU electricity markets. The European 
Commission (2007a, p.7), for example, concludes: “At the wholesale level, gas and electricity markets 
remain national in scope, and generally maintain the high level of concentration of the pre-
liberalization period. This gives scope for exercising market power.” 
The European Commission suggests structural remedies such as divestiture or asset swaps of power 
plants on a European scale (2007a, p.15), blocking mergers (2007a, p.12), auctioning large scale 
Virtual Power Plants (2007a, p.12), stimulating the entrance of new electricity generators (2007a, 
p.16), and increasing competition by enabling generators from abroad to sell electricity over cross-
border transmission lines (2007a, p.8). 
Several EU member states have experience with some of these structural measures. For example, in 
the end of the nineties, the UK forced dominant electricity generators to divest plants; the two 
dominant electricity generators NationalPower and PowerGen together divested 6GW in 1996 and 
another 8GW in 1999, thus lowering concentration (Green, 2006). However, beginning in 2000, the 
UK experienced mergers which reversed that trend.
1 The UK also experienced a considerable degree 
of new entry.
2 Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands are using, or used in the past, the 
auctioning of Virtual Power Plants
3 to lower market power (Willems, 2006). Finally, several countries 
increased the capacity of cross-border transmission lines and harmonized their market regimes with 
neighboring countries to make it easier for generators to sell electricity over borders, thus increasing 
competition. 
The encouragement of cross-border trading – while creating a larger, European, market – is likely 
to alleviate the concentration problem only marginally; many electricity companies have merged 
across borders, and have thus become players in neighboring countries (Matthes, Grashof, and Gores, 
2007). Increasing competition is therefore done most efficiently - avoiding duplication of investment 
in generation assets
4 - by divestiture; enforcing big incumbent power companies to sell parts of their 
plants, and thus adding to the capacity of competing new entrants. Of interest are also “softer” 
measures, such as discouraging incumbents to replace old plants and instead encouraging new entrants 
to build generation assets, as this is effectively a form of divestiture (no duplication of investment in 
generation assets).  
                                                      
*  We thank Libor Dušek, Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Morita Hodaka, Axel Ockenfelds, Paul Pezanis-Christou, participants at 
the ESA 2010 conference, and participants of a seminar at the Australian School of Business for their excellent 
comments. We are grateful for financial support from the REFGOV Integrated Project funded by the 6th European 
Research Framework Programme - CIT3-513420, research center grant No.LC542 of the Ministry of Education of the 
Czech Republic implemented at CERGE-EI, and the Loyola de Palacio chair at the RSCAS of the European University 
Institute. 
1  In 2002 one of the largest generators, PowerGen, merged with TXU Europe, thus adding 3GW to its capacity (Green, 
2006). 
2  The policy of allowing distributors to sign long-term contracts with independent power producers promoted entry of new 
the electricity producers, mainly with new Combined-Cycle- Gas-Turbine (CCGT) generation technology (Newbery, 
2002). 
3  When a generator sells a Virtual Power Plant, he sells part of his production capacity to other generators. This divestiture 
of generation capacity is called virtual as no production capacity changes hand, and the selling generator remains the 
owner of all its generation plants (Willems, 2006). 
4  Entry of new generators is generally not the most efficient solution to increase competition. When there is no need for 
new generation investment, entry, by adding excessive capacity, imposes deadweight losses on the market that can be 
larger than the gains of increased competition (Green, 1996). Divestiture is in such case the best alternative solution. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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In addition to such structural measures, policy makers and regulators have shown interest in 
behavioral measures that prevent electricity generators, through the appropriate organization of 
electricity markets, to be able to use their market power. The wording of EU law suggests that 
behavioral measures ought to be the default setting : “Structural remedies should only be imposed 
either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective 
behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural 
remedy” (European Commission, 2006).  
Allaz and Vila (1993) make the theoretical case for the introduction of a forward market as a 
behavioral measure that increases competitive pressure. Specifically, they show that a forward market 
lowers the amount of market power producers can exert: Producers earn the highest profit if nobody 
sells in the forward market, but selling in the forward market is a strictly dominant action for each 
individual producer. The contribution of Allaz and Villa (1993) is important since it has been argued 
that forward contracts are likely to decrease competition (Lévêque, 2006). 
In this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the effects on competition of 
introducing forward markets in electricity markets. For relevant parameterizations, we compare the 
results of the introduction of a forward market with those of the best alternative measure: reducing 
market concentration by divestiture. We do so for numbers of competitors that reflect better the market 
concentration in the old European states than previous literature has done: We also use realistic cost 
configurations and tease apart number and asset effect. 
We show that, theoretically and behaviorally, the effects of introducing a forward market might be 
larger than adding one more competitor in markets both with two and three producers. Previously, 
Brandts, Pezanis-Christou, and Schram (2008) came to the opposite conclusion for the case of three 
initial competitors. The question whether the theoretical predictions of Allaz and Villa (1993) will 
materialize in the reality of a dynamic setting such as the EU electricity market has clear policy 
implications. An affirmative answer would suggest that regulators formulate guidelines for, and 
promote, the design of effective forward markets.  
In the following section we first discuss the experimental design (i.e., the basic parameterizations, 
treatments, underlying working hypotheses) and experimental procedures as well as related literature. 
In section 3 we report the results focusing on aggregate quantity, efficiency, and production efficiency. 
In section 4 we conclude. The appendices contain robustness tests and instructions. 
2 Experimental design and procedures 
2.1 Treatments 
We identify the effects of adding one more competitor through divestment and the effects of 
introducing a forward market, and then compare whether the effects are stronger in the former case 
than in the latter.  
Table 1 shows our treatments and indicates how they compare with those of relevant earlier studies, 
namely LeCoq and Orzen (2006) and Brandts et al. (2008), about which more below. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
3 
Table 1: Treatment conditions 
  2 producers  3 producers  4 producers 
Without Forward Market  M2
#  M3*  M4
† 
With Forward Market  M2F
#  M3F* – 
Without Forward Market, zero costs  M2zc
§ –  – 
With Forward Market, zero costs  M2Fzc
§ –  – 
#  The condition is different from the one tested in LeCoq and Orzen (2006) in that producers here face quadratic marginal 
costs. 
†  The condition is different from the one tested in Brandts et al. (2008) in that the market has been created from the market 
with 3 producers not by entry, but by divestment; producers thus have the same set of assets as in the market with 3 
producers. 
§  The condition is identical to the one tested in LeCoq and Orzen (2006). 
*  The condition is identical to the one tested in Brandts et al. (2008). 
A key characteristic is the number of producers in the electricity market. While there is some variance, 
assuming two producers for markets in the New EU Member States (NMS-12)
5 and three producers 
for markets in the old EU Member States (EU-15)
6 seems a good approximation.
7  
Thus for the NMS-12 we compare outcomes in markets with two producers and without a forward 
market (M2) with outcomes in such markets with a forward market (M2F). We also compare the 
difference in outcomes with the difference in outcomes of markets with two (M2) and three producers 
(M3), when for the latter we add one more producer by means of divestiture. In other words, we 
compare the differences of M2F – M2 and M3 – M2. The markets M2zc and M2Fzc are treatments to 
allow comparison of our results with the experimental results of LeCoq and Orzen (2006).  
For the EU-15 we compare outcomes in markets with three producers and without a forward 
market (M3) with outcomes in such markets with a forward market (M3F). We also compare the 
difference in outcomes with the difference in outcomes of markets with three (M3) and four producers 
(M4), when for the latter re we add one more producer by means of divestiture. In other words, we 
compare the differences of M3F – M3 and M4 – M3.  
2.2 Earlier experiments 
LeCoq and Orzen (2006) conducted experiments in markets with two producers with and without a 
forward market and compared the outcomes with those in a market with four producers (with and 
without a forward market); importantly, their producers faced zero production costs. In line with 
earlier experiments, such as Huck et al. (2004), LeCoq and Orzen (2006) found that producers 
competed less (more) than predicted with two (four) producers. A forward market had a positive 
                                                      
5  The New EU Member States (NMS-12) are states that acceded to the EU in or after 2004. With the exception of Cyprus 
and Malthus these are all post-communistic countries: Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia 
(EST), Hungary (H), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Malta (M), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia 
(SLO). 
6  The old EU Member States (EU-15) are states that acceded to the EU before 2004. These are: Austria (A), Belgium (B), 
England (UK), Germany (D), Denmark (DK), Spain (E), France (F), Finland (FIN), Greece (GR), Italy (I), Ireland (IRL), 
Luxembourg (L), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (P), Sweden (S). 
7  The average Hirsch-Herfindahl Index (HHI) for the old (West-European) EU members in 2006 was equal to 3786, which 
is close to the case where three symmetrical firms compete (HHI=3333). The new (Central- and East European) EU 
members had in 2006 a HHI equal to 5558, which is closer to the case where two symmetrical firms compete 
(HHI=5000) (Van Koten and Ortmann, 2008). Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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effect, but weaker than expected. Adding two more producers increased output significantly more than 
introducing a forward market. 
LeCoq and Orzen (2006) consider the effects of a forward market in a market with two (and four) 
producers. While speaking possibly to the reality of electricity markets in the NMS-12 countries, the 
number of relevant competitors tends to be three for EU-15 countries. Moreover, the assumption that 
producers have zero marginal costs is unrealistic for all scenarios. In our experiment, producers 
therefore face, more realistically (e.g., Newbery, 2002) and in line with Brandts et al. (2008), quadratic 
marginal costs. 
Brandts et al. (2008) conducted experiments in markets with three producers with and without a 
forward market and compared the outcomes with those in a market with four producers (without a 
forward market). Producers had quadratic marginal costs. Brandts et al. (2008) find that a forward 
market significantly increases the quantity supplied, but that entry of a new generator increases the 
quantity supplied significantly stronger than the addition of a forward market.  
Brandts et al. (2008) confound two effects in their study: a pure number effect and an asset effect. 
The pure number effect is brought about by an additional market participant; this makes the market 
more competitive and results in lower prices and a larger total number of units supplied. The asset 
effect is brought about by the additional market participant’s production assets; the aggregate size of 
production assets in the market thus increases, which results in lower prices and a larger total number 
of units supplied. Thus, assuming efficient production, any given level of aggregate production (the 
production of all producers together) is produced cheaper in the market with four producers than in the 
market with three producers. We conjecture that the asset effect confound led to an overestimation of 
the effects of adding one more competitor in the study of Brandts et al. (2008). 
We therefore focus on the effect of divestiture as a benchmark for the effect of a forward market, 
and thus eliminate the asset effect confound. This insulates the number effect. To allow for 
comparisons, we drew (to the extent possible) on Brandts et al. (2008) and LeCoq and Orzen (2006) to 
parameterize our experiment.  
2.3 Demand and supply 
As in Brandts et al. (2008), the demand schedule is  ( ) (0,2000 27 ) p QM a x Q = − ,  0 Q ≥ .As also in 
Brandt et al. (2008), we chose to program the demand side rather than have it enacted by experimental 
participants. This might reduce demand uncertainty which in turn is likely to influence (the speed of) 
convergence in our market. We believe that this choice does not interact with the treatments in our 
experiment. 
For some treatments we model generators as having quadratic marginal costs. Marginal costs of 
producing electricity usually have a hockey-stick shape, i.e., they are flat with a sharp increase when 
capacity constraints become binding (Newbery, 2002). We consider marginal quadratic costs to be a 
reasonable approximation to the real cost curves of electricity generators. 
To be able to compare our results with those of Brandts et al. (2008), we also use the same 
specification of the costs for markets with three producers, M3 and M3F. Brandts et al. (2008) set the 
marginal cost of producing the i
th unit for a producer equal to 
2
3() 2 = mc q x , cumulative costs can 







== + + ∑
q
x
cq x x x x . 
The market with four producers, M4, is created from the market with three producers, M3, by 
divestiture; each of the three producers divests  1
4
th of their assets, and these three sets of assets are 
used to create a fourth, identical producer. The markets with two producers, M2 and M2F, are created Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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from the market with three producers, M3, by reversing the divestiture process (merger): one of the 
producers is split in halves and their assets are merged to the two remaining producers to create two 
larger, identical, producers. With the cost function of a producer in M3 given, the cost functions of 














cy y y =+ + .
8 
The electricity generation asset base is the same for all three markets (M2, M3, and M4). Therefore, 
when generators make identical choices and the aggregate production is equal over different markets, 
the aggregate costs must also be equal. This is indeed the case: Table 2 summarizes the production 
costs for each generator in the market with two (M2), three (M3) and four (M4) generators, and 
highlights occurrences where the aggregate production in one market is equal to that in another market 
as bold and colored. For example, the aggregate production in M2 (M4) is equal to that in M3 when 
the total number of units can be divided both by two (four) and three. 
Table 2:
9 Overview of aggregate cost of producing 
Market with two producers 
(after merger) 
Market with three 
producers 
(original market) 
Market with four producers 
 (after divestment) 









































































































































































































































































N  MC TC 2*N  2* TC  N MC TC  3*N  3*TC N MC  TC  4* N  4*TC 
0  0 0 0  0  00 0 0 0 0 00  0 0
1  1 1 2 2  12 2 36    
2  5 6 4  11  1 33  4 11
3  9 15  6  30  281 0 6 30    
4  16 31  8  62  2 12 15  8 62
5  24 55 10 111  31 8 2 8 98 4    
6  35 90 12  180  43 2 6 0 12 180 3 30 45  12 180
7  47 137  14 273  5 50 110 15 330    
8  60 197  16  394  4 54 99  16 394
9  76 273  18  546  6 72 182 18 546    
                                                      
8  With identical choices in the respective markets, the aggregate production in M3 and M4 is equal when it can be divided 
by both 3 and 4. Formally, when, for n
+ ∈  , the four producers in M4 each produce 3n  units, then their aggregate 
production is 43 1 2 nn ⋅= ; when the three producers in M3 each produce 4n  units, then their aggregate production is 
34 1 2 nn ⋅= . As a result, the aggregate costs must be the same in these cases. Thus  
43 43 34 [] [] cy cy ⋅⋅ = ⋅⋅  and 
32
43
34 3 2 4
43 2 7 3 3
[] [ ]
y




23 2 73 3
[] [ ]
yy y
cy c y = ⋅⋅ =++ . Notice that for marginal costs holds the equality: 
33
23 4 24 [] [ ] [] cy c y cy ′′ ′ == . Conforming to intuition, the marginal cost of a producer in M3 thus increases faster 
(slower) than in M2 (M4). 
9  Numbers have been rounded to the nearest whole number. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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10  93 366  20  733  5 84 183  20 733
11  113 479  22 957  7 98 280 21 840    
12  133 612  24  1224  8 128 408 24 1224 6 123 306  24 1224
13  156 768  26 1536 9 162 570 27 1710    
14  180 948  28  1897  7 168 474  28 1897
15  207 1155  30  2310  10 200 770 30 2310    
16  235 1390  32  2779  8 221 695  32 2779
17  264 1654  34 3308  11 242 1012 33 3036    
18  296 1950  36  3900  12 288 1300 36 3900 9 280 975  36 3900
19  329 2279  38 4559  13 338 1638 39 4914    
20  365 2644  40  5287  10 347 1322  40 5287
21  401 3045  42  6090  14 392 2030 42 6090    
22  440 3485  44  6970  11 420 1742  44 6970
23  480 3965  46 7931  15 450 2480 45 7440    
24  523 4488  48  8976  16 512 2992 48 8976 12 502 2244  48 8976
25  567 5055  50 10109  17 578 3570 51 10710    
26  612 5667  52  11334  13 590 2834  52 11334
27  660 6327  54  12654  18 648 4218 54 12654    
28  709 7036  56  14073  14 684 3518  56 14073
29  761 7797  58 15593  19 722 4940 57 14820    
30  813 8610  60  17220  20 800 5740 60 17220 15 787 4305  60 17220
31  868 9478  62 18956  21 882 6622 63 19866  
32  924 10402  64  20805  16 896 5201  64 20805
33  983 11385  66  22770  22 968 7590 66 22770    
34  1043 12428  68  24855  17 1013 6214  68 24855
35  1104 13532  70 27064  23 1058 8648 69 25944    
36  1168 14700  72  29400  24 1152 9800 72 29400 18 1136 7350  72 29400
37  1233 15933  74 31867  25 1250 11050 75 33150    
38  1301 17234  76  34467  19 1267 8617  76 34467
39  1369 18603  78  37206  26 1352 12402 78 37206    
40  1440 20043  80  40086  20 1405 10022  80 40086
41  1512 21555  82 43111  27 1458 13860 81 41580    
42  1587 23142  84  46284  28 1568 15428 84 46284 21 1549 11571  84 46284
43  1663 24805  86 49609  29 1682 17110 87 51330    
44  1740 26545  88  53090  22 1702 13273  88 53090
45  1820 28365  90  56730  30 1800 18910 90 56730    
46  1901 30266  92  60533  23 1860 15133  92 60532
47  1985 32251  94  64501  31 1922 20832 93 62496    
48  2069 34320  96  68640  32 2048 22880 96 68640 24 2027 17160  96 68640
To help subjects focus on the decision task, we presented to our subjects costs that were rounded 
according to the following rounding rules: 
•  All numbers smaller than 100 were rounded to the nearest integer number. 
•  when a number was larger than 100, it was rounded to the nearest 5-fold 
•  when a number was larger than 1000, it was rounded to the nearest 10-fold 
•  when a number was larger than 10000, it was rounded to the nearest 50-fold Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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As a result these rounding rules, some of the aggregate total costs in Table 2 are different. The 
discrepancy is small however; on average of the absolute discrepancies is 0.12%. For the “rounded 
numbers” version of table 2, see table A1 in the Appendix. 
The numbers we obtained after this rounding procedure were also the numbers we use to calculate 
the theoretical predictions.
10  
2.4 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
Table 3 shows the theoretical predictions for our treatments M2, M2F, M3, M3F, and M4. The prefix 
NE stands for Nash-equilibrium, Walras for the efficient solution, and JPM for Joint Profit 
Maximization (the monopoly solution).
 11 
























ti q   –  2  11  –  5  –    – – – –  –  – 
ti q  20 20 22  14/15
12 15  11 25/26
13  17 13 16  11  8 
t q   40  40  44 43 45  44 51  51  52  32 33  32 
t p   920  920  812 839 785  812 623  623  596 1136  1109  1136 
Prod. S.  31520  31520  28768 29537 27885  28768 21053  21063  19672  33572 33567  33572 
Cons. S.  21060  21060  25542 24381 26730  25542 34425  34425  35802  13392 14256  13392 
Total S.  52580  52580  54310 53918 54615  54310 55478  55488  55474  46964 47823  46964 
Eff. (%)  94.8  94.8  97.9 97.2 98.4  97.9 100  100  100  84.7 86..2  84.7 
                                                      
10  Using the not rounded numbers gives virtually identical theoretical predictions, 
11  The markets JPM (n=3) , JPM (n=4), NE C3.0, NE C3.2, Walras (n=3), Walras (n=4) and NE C4.0 in this experiment are 
identically to those in Brandts et al. (2008), and our predictions are almost identical to the ones reported in their paper. 
Key differences are: Using the functions without a rounding procedure, we find that for the Nash-equilibrium with three 
producers (M3) the price is equal to 839 rather than 866, as reported in Brandts et al. (2008). We find that for the Nash-
equilibrium with four generators (M4), the price is equal to 677 rather than 704. Also, the producer surplus of M4 is 
equal to 27635 rather than 27638. For the welfare maximizing outcome with four generators, Walras (n=4), we find that 
all three generators produce 14 units and one of them 15 units, instead of all of the generators producing 14 units. Total 
welfare is therefore 60799 and not 60788. For the monopoly case with four generators, JPM (n=4), two generators 
produce 9 units and two 8 units, instead of all of them 8 units. As a result the producer surplus is higher, 34832 instead of 
34728, the consumer surplus is lower, 15147 instead of 17010, and efficiency is lower, 82.2% instead of 85.1%. 
For the Nash-equilibrium with three producers and a forward market (M3F), we find a unique symmetrical Nash-
equilibrium in pure strategies where each producer sells 5 units in the forward market, and 10 additional units in the spot 
market. This is different from Brandts et al. (2008), who for the treatment with the forward market (M3F) chose to 
broaden their equilibrium concept by considering partially mixed strategies (for the choice of additional units) and thus 
find an equilibrium where each producer sells 6 units in the forward market, and an additional 9 with probability .944 and 
10 with probability 0.056. As we find a unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies, we do not follow Brandts 
et al. (2008) in broadening the equilibrium concept for one treatment case (no mixed strategies are considered for the 
other treatments). In any case, the total (expected) production by all three producers we find and the one reported by 
Brandts et al. (2008) are the same – 45 units. 
12  One generator produces 15 units, the other two 14 units. 
13  One generator produces 26 units, the other two 25 units. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
8 
The theoretical predictions give us, for the particular parameterizations chosen, an indication of the 
effect on aggregate production and efficiency of introducing a forward market or adding one more 
competitor.
14 For markets with three producers, both introducing a forward market and adding one 
more competitor increases aggregate production, but introducing a forward market increases aggregate 
production more. For markets with two producers, adding one more competitor increases aggregate 
production. Introducing a forward market increases aggregate production only if the higher Nash-
equilibrium is realized. In fact, aggregate production in that case is increased more than in the case of 
one more competitor. Using q(x) to denote aggregate production in market structure x
15, we thus 
conjecture that the measures can be ranked as follows: q(M3F) > q(M4) > q(M3). Likewise, both 
measures also increase efficiency, but introducing a forward market again is predicted to increase 
efficiency the most. Using Ω (x) to denote efficiency in market structure x, we thus conjecture that the 
measures can be ranked as follows: Ω (M3F) > Ω (M4) > Ω (M3). 
For markets with two producers, both introducing a forward market and adding one more 
competitor increases aggregate production, but the existence of two Nash-equilibria makes it 
impossible to rank the measures. We conjecture that the measures can be ranked as follows: q(M2F) > 
q(M2), q(M3) > q(M2), and q(M2F) = q(M3). Moreover, the theoretical results suggest that the effect 
of introducing a forward market is not as large as adding two more competitors; we thus conjecture 
q(M4) > q(M2F). Both measures also increase efficiency but again they cannot be ranked. We 
conjecture that: Ω(M2F) > Ω(M2), Ω(M3) > Ω(M2), Ω(M2F) = Ω (M3), and Ω(4) > Ω(M2F). 
We also test for effects on production efficiency. As marginal costs are quadratic, production is 
fully efficient only if the aggregate production is evenly distributed over the producers. Like Brandts 
et al. (2008) we assume that more producers in a market should make it more difficult to achieve an 
even distribution, but that introducing a forward market should not have an effect. We thus conjecture 
Φ(M4) < Φ(M3) < Φ(M2),  Φ(M3F) = Φ(M3), and Φ(M2F) = Φ(M2). Table 4 summarizes our 
hypotheses. 
Table 4: Hypotheses 
Hq.1 (Quantity)  HΩ.1 (Efficiency)  HΦ.1 (Production Efficiency) 
-  q(M3F) > q(M4) > q(M3)  -  Ω(M3F) > Ω(M4) > Ω(M3) -  Φ(M3F) = Φ(M3) 
   -   Φ(M4) < Φ(M3) 
 
Hq.2 (Quantity)  HΩ.2 (Efficiency)  HΦ.2 (Production Efficiency) 
-  q(M2F) > q(M2)  -  Ω(M2F) > Ω(M2) -  Φ(M2F) = Φ(M2) 
-  q(M3) > q(M2)  -  Ω(M3) > Ω(M2) -  Φ(M3) < Φ(M2) 
-  q(M2F) = q(M3)  -  Ω(M2F) = Ω(M3)  
 
Hq.3 (Quantity)  HΩ.3 (Efficiency)   
-  q(M4) >q( M2F)  -  Ω (M4) > q (M2F)   
 
                                                      
14  The Nash-equilibria have been numerically determined with Mathematica programs. The set of programs can be 
downloaded as a RAR file named “Nash-Equilibria with Forward Markets.RAR”, at XXX. The predictions are based on 
the cost functions with numbers rounded according to the rounding procedure described above. Predictions based on the 
continuous cost functions are, except for the M2F condition, mostly identical: the chosen quantities are identical, and the 
difference in total surplus is lower than 0.02%. In the M2F condition the chosen quantities in the low Nash-equilibrium 
are lower when using the continuous functions – it is 40 instead of 42. As a result the difference in total surplus is 
relatively high: 1.8%.  
15 To  facilitate  comparisons with related literature, we use the same notation as Brandts et al. (2008). Also parts of our 
presentation have been inspired by Brandts et al. (2008). Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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2.5 Experimental procedures 
The experimental sessions were conducted in October 2009, December 2009, and April 2010 in 
Prague at the Center of Economic Research and Graduate Education and Economic Institute (CERGE-
EI).
16 Our subjects were students at the Charles University or at the University of Economics. A total 
of 198 students participated. The session with a forward market lasted about 2 hours, the sessions 
without a forward market lasted about 90 minutes. At the beginning of each session, the English 
instructions were read to the subjects by the experimenter (Van Koten).  
The market simulation was programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).The demand schedule was 
pre-programmed. Experimental participants took on the role of sellers only. They were not shown the 
demand schedule but were given on screen, and as printout, a payoff -table.  
3. Results 
We have 11 statistically independent data points for all treatments (each data point below we call “a 
group” consisting of the aggregate of sellers in a particular treatment); since each participant took part 
in one experimental session, data points are also statistically independent across treatments. None of 
the participants went bankrupt. Each treatment consisted of 24 rounds. For our statistical tests, we use 
only the last 12 rounds of the data, as the experiment is complicated and, we know – for example, 
from relatively easy auction experiments – that subjects need several rounds of trading to become 
familiar with the laboratory environment before they react to the embedded incentives (Hertwig and 
Ortmann, 2001). Following LeCoq and Orzen (2006), we test for disparity with the Nash-equilibrium 
predictions using two-sided Wilcoxon one-sample signed-rank tests (two-sided signed-rank tests), 
unless indicated otherwise. For comparison between the averages of the treatment in our experiment, 
we use, following Brandts et al. (2008), F-tests based on an OLS regression of the dependent variable 
on the 5 treatment dummies, M2, M2F, M3, M3F, and M4, without a constant (F-tests). The error 
terms are adjusted for clustered data by using the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator (Froot, 
1989).
  To compare three ordered inequalities, we also run, following Brandts et al. (2008), a 
Jonckheere test, which makes no distributional assumptions. In addition, we ran robustness tests using, 
as did LeCoq and Orzen (2006), Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (rank-sum tests). These tests confirmed 
most of the results presented here. A detailed comparison may be found in the Appendix. 
3.1 Aggregate Quantity  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of total (aggregate) quantities sold per period, averaged over treatment 
groups. The treatments with two traders are represented by circles, with three traders by triangles, and 
with four traders by squares. The treatments without forward markets are represented by open circles, 
triangles or squares, the treatments with forward markets by filled circles or triangles. 
All treatments start out rather low
17 but trade volume moves quickly into the direction of the Nash-
equilibrium. Between rounds 8 and 12 behavior has stabilized. 
                                                      
16  We obtained in October 2009 four data points for each treatment, in December 2009 four data points for M2zc, M2Fzc, 
M2F, M2, ,M3, and three data points for the treatments M3F and M4, and in April 2010 three data points for M2zc, 
M2Fzc, M2F, M2, M3, and four data points for the treatments M3F and M4. The original game plan was to obtain four 
data points for all treatments also in December 2009. Excessive numbers of no-shows for treatments M3F and M4 
derailed that plan. Several pilot sessions were run during the summer of 2009. None of the subjects in the pilot (mostly 
CERGE-EI students) participated in the regular sessions.  
17  It is likely that these trajectories are anchored by the examples in the instructions; in the examples we used low numbers 
to facilitate understanding of the basic relationships. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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Figure 1: Aggregate production 


































Table 5 shows the overall average aggregate production per treatment group, with the standard error in 
parenthesis.
18 The row below gives the size of the observed aggregated quantity relative to the Nash-
equilibrium prediction in percentages.  
Table 5: Production averages 
  M2 M2F M3  M3F M4 
Average 
production  
39.3 (1.52)  46.3 (2.06)  44.2 (1.22)  49.6 (0.61)  46.2 (0.98) 
% of NE prediction  98.7%  116 % / 105%
19  102.9% 110.1% 105.0% 
Number of 
observations 
N=11  N=11 N=11 N=11 N=11 






92,7%, Huck et 
al. (2004) 
93,8%, LeCoq 
and Orzen (2006) 
102.7%, Huck et 
al. (2004) 
98.9%, Brandts 
et al. (2008) 
103.6%, Brandts 
et al. (2008) 
113.7%, LeCoq 
and Orzen (2006) 
102.8%, Brandts 
et al. (2008) 
102.9%, Huck et 
al. (2004) 
Notice that in the M2 and M2F conditions the standard error is relatively high. Of the treatments 
without forward markets, M2 and M3 are not significantly different from the Nash-equilibrium 
predictions (two-sided signed rank test, both p-values > 0.32), while M4 is significantly larger (p-
                                                      
18  The standard error is computed based on the values of the averages for each group over the last 12 rounds. 
19  The first number gives the percentage of efficiency relative to the low production Nash-equilibrium, the second number 
relative to the high production Nash-equilibrium. 
20  The averages by Huck et al. (2004) reported here are based on their meta-analysis of 19 experiments with Cournot 
competition. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that our results are not significantly different from their results (p-
values for M2, M3 and M4 are 0.155, 0.657 and 0.534 respectively). Compared with Brandts et al. (2008), the production 
is significantly higher in condition M3F (p < 0.006) and not significantly different in the conditions M3 (p-value=0.213) 
and M4 (p-value=0.534). Compared with LeCoq and Orzen (2006), production is significantly higher in conditions M2F 
(p-value=0.010 for the low and p-value=0.033 for the high Nash-equilibrium) and M4 (p-value=0.010) and not 
significantly different in condition M2 (p-value= 0.182). For comparison, we also ran treatments with zero production 
costs, M2zc and M2Fzc. In these treatments the average production is 83% of the Nash-equilibrium prediction, which is 
significantly lower than LeCoq and Orzen (2006) found (both p-values < 0.041). See the Appendix for a detailed 
exposition. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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value=0.068). Of the treatments with a forward market, the production in M3F is significantly higher 
than the Nash-equilibrium (p-values = 0.004) and production in M2F is significantly higher than the 
low Nash-equilibrium (p-value=0.021), but is not significantly different from the high Nash-
equilibrium (p-value=0.248).  
Without a forward market, when the number of competitors is equal to two (three or four), 
production tends to be smaller (larger) than the Nash-equilibrium, which is in line with earlier findings 
(LeCoq and Orzen, 2006; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004). We see no evidence for collusion; 
indeed the data suggest the opposite. A regression of aggregate production on the period of the 
experiment shows a significant upwards slope, suggesting that over time, as subjects become more 
experienced with the task, they become less likely to collude. 
Table 6: Test results quantity hypotheses 
  OLS regression, with correction for clustering on 
group level, followed by an one-sided F-test on 
equality of the coefficients 
Jonckheere test 











q (M3F) ≥ q (M4) ≥ q (M3), 
with at least one of the 
inequalities being strict 
p-value = 0.0000 
  N= 792  N= 924  N= 924  N= 1320 
        









q(M2F) = q(M3) 
(p=0.374) 
q (M2F) ≥ q (M3) ≥ q (M2), 
with at least one of the 
inequalities being strict*** 
p-value = 0.0000. 
Number of 
observations 
N= 528  N= 660  N= 660  N= 924 
        
Hq.3 q(M4)  > 
q(M2F) 
(p=0.521) 
    
 N=  792       
Table 6 presents the test for our hypothesis using F-tests based on an OLS regression and Jonckheere 
tests.
21 
Hypothesis q.2: q(M3F) > q(M4) > q(M3). 
We find partial support for Hypothesis q.1: 
•  q(M3F) ≤ q(M3) is REJECTED in favor of q(M3F) > q(M3), p-value<0.001. 
•  q(M4) ≤ q(M3) is NOT rejected in favor of Ω(M4) > q(M3) , p-value=0.105. 
•  q(M3F) ≤ q(M4) is REJECTED in favor of q(M3F) > q(M4) , p-value=0.002 . 
•  q(M3F) = q(M4) = q(M3) is REJECTED in favor of q (M3F) ≥ q (M4) ≥ q (M3), with at least 
one of the inequalities being strict. 
Introducing a forward market increases aggregate production with 12% in markets with three 
competitors (q(M3F) > q(M3), p-value < 0.001). This confirms earlier findings such as in Brandts et 
al. (2008). Adding one more competitor in markets with three competitors increases aggregate 
                                                      
21  As a robustness test we also compared the averages for the groups using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) test. The hypotheses accepted (rejected) are the same, except for Hypothesis 2.b (which becomes insignificant) 
and Hypothesis 3.c (which becomes significant). See the Appendix for a detailed analysis Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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production with 4%, and this effect is barely significant, p-value=0.105). We find that introducing a 
forward market increases the aggregate production by 7% more than increasing competition by adding 
one more competitor, and this difference is strongly significant (q(M3F) > q(M4), p-value=0.002). 
Hypothesis q.2: q(M2F) > q(M2), q(M3) > q(M2), q(M2F) = q(M3), and q(M2F) < q(M4). 
We find support for Hypothesis q.2: 
•  q(M2F) ≤ q(M2) is REJECTED in favor of q(M2F) > q(M2), p-value= 0.003. 
•  q(M3) ≤ q(M2) is REJECTED in favor of q(M3) > q(M2) , p-value= 0.006. 
•  q(M2F) = q(M3) is NOT rejected in favor of q(M2F) ≠ q(M3) , p-value= 0.374. 
•  q(M2F) = q(M3) = q(M2) is REJECTED in favor of q (M2F) ≥ q (M3) ≥ q (M2), with at least 
one of the inequalities being strict, p-value= 0.0000. 
In line with the theoretical predictions, introducing a forward market increases aggregate production 
with 18% in markets with two competitors and this increase is strongly significant (q(M2F) > q(M2), 
p-value= 0.003). Adding one more competitor in markets with two competitors increases aggregate 
production with 12% and this increase is significant (q(M3) > q(M2), p-value= 0.006). Introducing a 
forward market increases aggregate production with 5% more than adding one more competitor, but 
this effect is not significant (q(M2F)=q(M2), p-value= 0.344). A Jonckheere test rejects q.1 in favor of 
q (M2F) ≥ q (M3) ≥ q (M2), p-value= 0.0000), with at least one of the inequalities being strict. 
Hypothesis q.3: q(M4) > q(M2F). 
We find no support for Hypothesis q.3:  
•  q(M4) ≤ q(M2F) is NOT rejected in favor of q(M4) < q(M2F), p-value= 0.521. 
In contrast with the theoretical predictions, the effect of introducing a forward market with two 
competitors does not increase competition significantly less than doubling the number of competitors. 
Our data rather indicate the opposite ordering; q(M2F) is 4% higher than q(M4). This is surprising as 
LeCoq and Orzen (2006) found that the production of two competitors with forward market is strictly 
lower than that of four competitors without a forward market.
22  
3.2 Efficiency  
We define efficiency, following Brandts et al. (2008), as the joint consumer and producer surplus 
realized in the experiment divided by the maximum joint consumer and producer surplus (the 
Walrasian level of joint surplus). Figure 2 shows the evolution of efficiency per period, averaged over 
groups. Efficiency quickly converges and after period 8 its level is equal or higher than 90% for all 
treatments except M2. The highest efficiency levels in the last twelve periods are realized by 
treatments with forward markets, M2F and M3F.
23  
                                                      
22  In the experiment of LeCoq and Orzen (2006) competitors incurred no costs in production, unlike in our experiments. 
This indicates that, in contradiction with theory, production costs might play a relevant role in the competitiveness of 
markets. 
23  See the Appendix for graphs of efficiency levels per period for the individual treatment together with the Nash-
equilibrium prediction. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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Figure 2: Efficiency percentages 









































Table 7 shows the observed average efficiency level in the last 12 rounds, with the standard error in 
parenthesis. The row below gives the level of the observed average efficiency level relative to the 
Nash-equilibrium prediction in percentages. The efficiency levels are close to the Nash-equilibrium 
prediction; efficiency is significantly lower in M2 (p-value <0.068) and higher in M2F (p-value 
=0.083 in the low and 0.790 in the high Nash-equilibrium). This is mostly in line with earlier findings 
such as in Brandts et al. (2008).  
Table 7: Efficiency averages 
 M2  M2F  M3  M3F  M4 
Average efficiency as % 
of Walras 
92.0 (1.71)  95.5 (1.73) 95.6 (0.77) 98.7 (0.32)  96.1 (0.57)
% of NE prediction  97.2%  97.5%/ 100.7%
24 98.3% 100.5%  98.6% 
 N=11  N=11  N=11  N=11  N=11 







and Orzen (2006) 
94.2%, 
Brandts et al. 
(2008) 
96.7%, 
Brandts et al. 
(2008) 
95.4%, Brandts 




Table 8 presents the results of the F-tests and Jonckheere test.
26 Aggregate production in the market is 
the most important determinant of efficiency, as production inefficiency only has a minor influence. 
The results of the tests of hypotheses regarding efficiency thus closely follow those regarding 
aggregate production. 
                                                      
24  The first number gives the percentage of efficiency relative to the high production Nash-equilibrium, the second number 
relative to the low production Nash-equilibrium. 
25  Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare with the results reported by Brandts et al. (2008) shows that in our results 
efficiency is significantly higher (p-values=0.003 for M3, M3F and M4). Compared with LeCoq and Orzen (2006, 
efficiency is significantly higher in condition M2F (p-value= 0.062 for the low Nash-equilibrium and p-value= 0.050 for 
the high Nash-equilibrium), significantly lower in condition M4 (p-value=0.003) and not significantly different in M2 (p-
value= 0.131). 
26  The robustness tests, one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, confirmed our results at the same significance levels. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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Table 8: Test results for HΩ.1, HΩ.2 and HΩ.3 
  OLS regression, with correction for clustering on 
group level, followed by an one-sided F-test on 
equality of the coefficients 
Jonckheere test 











Ω (M3F) ≥ Ω (M4) ≥ Ω 
(M3), with at least one of 
the inequalities being strict 
p-value < 0.001. 
Number of 
observations 
N= 792  N= 924  N= 924 N= 1320 
        








Ω(M2F) = Ω(M3) 
(p= 0.927) 
 
Ω (M2F) ≥ Ω (M3) ≥ Ω 
(M2), with at least one of 
the inequalities being 
strict*** 
p-value < 0.001. 
Number of 
observations 
N= 528  N= 660  N= 660  N= 924 
        
HΩ.3  Ω(M4) > 
Ω(M2F) 
(p=0.351) 
    
Number of 
observations 
N= 792       
Hypothesis Ω.1: Ω (M3F) > Ω (M4) > Ω (M3) 
We find partial support for Hypothesis Ω.1: 
•  Ω(M3F) ≤ Ω(M3) is REJECTED in favor of Ω(M3F) > Ω(M3), p-value<0.001. 
•  Ω(M4) ≤ Ω(M3) is NOT rejected in favor of Ω(M4) > Ω(M3) , p-value=0.293. 
•  Ω(M3F) ≤ Ω(M4) is REJECTED in favor of Ω(M3F) > Ω(M4) , p-value<0.001. 
•  Ω(M3F) = Ω(M4) = Ω(M3) is REJECTED in favor of Ω (M3F) ≥ Ω (M4) ≥ Ω (M3), with at 
least one of the inequalities being strict, p-value<0.001. 
Introducing a forward market in a market with three producers increases efficiency with 3.1% and 
this is strongly significant Ω (M3F) > Ω (M3), p-value < 0.001). Adding one more competitor 
increases efficiency with a mere 0.5%, and this is not significant (NOT Ω (M4) > Ω (M3), p-value = 
0.293). The increase in efficiency from introducing a forward market is larger than that from adding 
one more competitor, and that effect is strongly significant (Ω (M3F) > Ω (M4), p-value < 0.001).  
Hypothesis Ω.2: Ω (M2F) > Ω (M2), Ω (M2F) > Ω (M2), Ω (M2F) > Ω (M3). 
We find support for Hypothesis Ω.2: 
•  Ω(M2F) ≤ Ω(M2) is REJECTED in favor of Ω(M2F) > Ω(M2), p-value=0.075. 
•  Ω(M3) ≤ Ω(M2) is REJECTED in favor of Ω(M3) > Ω(M2) , p-value=0.026. 
•  Ω(M2F) = Ω(M3) is NOT rejected in favor of Ω(M2F) ≠ Ω(M3) , p-value=0.927. 
•  Ω(M2F) = Ω(M3) = Ω(M2) is REJECTED in favor of Ω (M2F) ≥ Ω (M3) ≥ Ω (M2), with at 
least one of the inequalities being strict, p-value<0.001. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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Introducing a forward market increases efficiency with 3.5% and this is significant (Ω (M2F) > 
Ω(M3), p-value = 0.075). Adding one more competitor increases efficiency with 1.1% and this is also 
significant (Ω (M3) > Ω(M2), p-value = 0.026). The increase in efficiency due to the introduction of a 
forward market is not significantly larger than that due to adding one more competitor (NOT (Ω(M3F) 
≠ Ω(M4), p-value = 0.927). 
Hypothesis Ω.3: Ω (M2F)< Ω(M4) 
We find no support for Hypothesis Ω.3: 
•  Ω (M4) ≤ Ω(M2F) is NOT rejected in favor of Ω (M4) > Ω(M2F), p-value=0.351. 
The effect of introducing a forward market with two competitors does not increase efficiently 
significantly less than doubling the number of competitors. 
3.3 Production Efficiency  
We define production efficiency, following Brandts et al. (2008), as the actual producer surplus 
divided by the producer surplus had production taken place in the most efficient manner.
27 Figure 2 
shows the evolution of efficiency per period, averaged over groups. Efficiency quickly converges and 
after period 8 its level is mostly equal or higher than 90% for all treatments. 
The treatments with 2 traders are represented by circles, with 3 traders by triangles, and with 4 
traders by squares. The treatments without forward markets are represented by open rounds, triangles 
or squares, the treatments with forward markets by filled rounds or triangles. M3 is clearly lower than 
M2, and M2F is most of the time in the middle. M4 is clearly lower than M3 and M3F, while there is 
no visible difference between M3 and M3F. 








































Table 9 shows the overall average of production efficiency in the last 12 rounds, with the standard 
error in parenthesis. The row below gives the size of the observed aggregated quantity relative to the 
                                                      
27  Given the quadratic marginal cost function this implies an as even as possible division of units over the producers. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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Nash-equilibrium prediction in percentages. Table 10 shows the test results of the hypotheses HΦ.1 
and HΦ.2.
28 
Table 9: Production efficiency averages 
  M2  M2F M3  M3F M4 










Number  of  observations  N=11 N=11 N=11 N=11  N=11 
Table 10: Test results for HΦ.1 and HΦ.2 
  OLS regression, with correction for clustering 
on group level, followed by a one-sided F test 
HΦ.1 – Markets with 3 
producers 
Φ(M4) < Φ(M3)* 
(p=0.093) 
Φ(M3F) < Φ(M3) 
(p= 0.666) 
Number of observations  N= 1001  N= 858 
    
HΦ.2– Markets with 2 
producers  
Φ(M3) < Φ(M2)** 
(p=0.019) 
Φ(M2F) < Φ(M2)** 
(p=0.046) 
Number of observations  N= 715  N= 572 
Hypothesis Φ.1:  
We find support for Hypothesis Φ.1: 
•  Φ(M4) ≥ Φ(M3) is REJECTED in favor of Φ(M4) < Φ(M3) , p-value=0.093. 
•  Φ(M3F) ≥ Φ(M3) is NOT rejected in favor of Φ(M3F) < Φ(M3) , p-value=0.666. 
Adding one more competitor to M3 decreases the production efficiency with 2.4%, and this decrease 
is significant (Φ(M4) < Φ(M3) , p-value=0.093). Introducing a forward market does not lower 
production efficiency; the data rather suggest the opposite as efficiency is higher in the market with a 
forward market than in the market without one (though not significantly so).  
Hypothesis Φ.2: Φ(2F) < Φ(M2), and Φ(3F) < Φ(M3) 
We find support for Hypothesis Φ.2: 
•  Φ(M3) ≥ Φ(M2) is REJECTED in favor of Φ(M3) < Φ(M2) , p-value=0.019. 
•  Φ(M2F) ≥ Φ(M2) is REJECTED in favor of Φ(M2F) < Φ(M2) , p-value=0.046. 
Adding one more competitor to M2 decreases production efficiency with 1.4%.
29 Introducing a 
forward market to a market decreases production efficiency with 1.5%. Both decreases are significant. 
3.4 Summary of results 
Table 11 summarizes our theoretical and experimental results for the aggregate production, together 
with the key results of earlier experiments. We do not summarize the data on efficiency and 
productive inefficiency because the data on efficiency closely follow the patterns of the data on 
                                                      
28  Robustness tests confirm our results, but show a weaker significance (p-value=0.100) for Φ(M4) < Φ(M3). 
29 Running,  in  addition,  a Jonkheere test rejects Φ(M4) ≤ Φ(M3) ≤ Φ(M2) in favor of Φ(M4) ≤ Φ(M3) ≤ Φ(M2) ), with at 
least one of the inequalities being strict, p-value=0.0000. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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aggregate production, while the effect of productive inefficiency is small and inconsequential (see 
section 3.3). 
Table 11: Comparison of our results with those of earlier studies 
    Theoretical predictions in 
our study 
Results of earlier studies  Our study 
One more 
competitor 
+ 7.5%  -  + 12.1% ** 
FM  •  Same (low Nash-
equilibrium) 
•  + 10% (high Nash-
equilibrium) 
+ 20.9% ***  
(LeCoq&Orzen, 2006) 






•  OMC: 7.5% higher 
than FM (low Nash-
equilibrium) 
 
•  FM: 2.3% higher 
than OMC (high 
Nash-equilibrium) 
-  FM: 4.7% higher 
than OMC  
(not significant) 
       
One more 
competitor 
+ 2.3%   + 19.6% ***  
(Brandts et al., 2008 ) 
+ 4.4%  
(not significant) 
FM  + 4.7%  + 9.5% **  
(Brandts et al., 2008 ) 






FM: 2.3% higher than 
One more competitor 
OMC: 9.2% higher than 
FM** 
(Brandts et al., 2008) 
FM: 7.3% higher 
than OMC*** 
OMC:   One More Competitor  
FM:   Forward Market 
█:    Results contrast with earlier results 
█:    Results contradict earlier results 
Our results show that in markets with three competitors, in line with our theoretical prediction and 
earlier experimental results (Brandts et al., 2008), introducing a forward market significantly increases 
aggregate production. Introducing a forward market increases aggregate production significantly more 
than adding one more competitor, which is in line with our theoretical prediction, but which 
contradicts the findings of Brandts et al. (2008) (the contradictory findings are indicated by the red 
background in Tabel 11). In line with our theoretical prediction, adding one more competitor increases 
aggregate production. The increase is, however, not significant, which is in contrast with the findings 
of Brandts et al. (2008). The lack of significance is likely caused by the relatively small number of 
observations. 
In markets with two competitors, in line with earlier experimental results (LeCoq and Orzen, 
2006), introducing a forward market significantly increases aggregate production. Our data suggest 
that this increase is larger than that of adding one more competitor: The difference is not significant 
but has a marginal significance in our robustness test. The lack of significance is also likely caused by 
the relatively small number of observations. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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4. Conclusion 
We have tried to better understand the comparative advantages of structural measures and behavioral 
measures of deregulation in electricity markets. We investigate theoretically and experimentally the 
effects of the introduction of a forward market on competition in electricity markets. We compared 
this scenario with the best alternative, reducing concentration by adding one more competitor by 
divestiture. Our work contributes to the literature by introducing more realistic cost configurations, 
teasing apart number and asset effect, and studying numbers of competitors that reflect better the 
market concentration in the old European states. 
Our experimental results suggest not only that the behavioral measure of introducing a forward 
market in concentrated markets with two or three competitors is an effective measure for increasing 
the aggregate supply, but also that this effect is larger than that of the structural measure of adding one 
more competitor by divestment. This is a policy relevant discovery: competition authorities should, in 
line with the EU law rather focus on the behavioral measure of introducing a forward market than on 
the structural measure of lowering market concentration by divestiture.  
At present, the EU has no single policy towards the design of forward markets for electricity.  
Such a policy might improve on the effectiveness of forward markets in the EU, as design is an 
important factor for the thickness of forward markets in EU countries (European Commission, 2007a, 
p.127). In Spain, for example, forward trading is de facto forbidden by design (European Commission, 
2007a, p.127). In Greece forward trading has been made virtually impossible by design, as it has made 
trading in the pool mandatory (European Commission, 2007b, p.50). In contrast, in France the 
PowerNext exchange market allows for the trading of forward and future contracts of months, 
quarters, and years ahead. Our study indicates that the design or evolution of such public forward 
exchanges as in France (and many other developed markets) should be encouraged, especially as the 
public observabillity of forward position is essential for the competition-increasing effect of Allaz and 
Villa (1993) to arise (Hughes and Jennifer, 1997).  
Our results contradict the findings of Brandts et al. (2008). Brandts et al. (2008) found a stronger 
effect for the structural measure of adding one more competitor than for the behavioral measure of 
introducing a forward market. Their result stems most likely from the confound of competition effect 
and asset effect. In Brandts et al. (2008) adding one more competitor not only increases competition, 
but also increases the aggregate asset base, which reduces the aggregate cost and thus gives an extra 
incentive to increase production. This asset effect is likely influential, as producers have steeply 
increasing costs. In our study we control for this asset effect by adding one more competitor by 
divestiture. As a result the effect of the structural measure of adding one more competitor has is 
weaker and is now dominated by the effect of the behavioral measure of introducing a forward market Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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6. Appendix 
A1. Production costs 
Table 12: Overview of aggregate cost of producing (rounded numbers) 
Market with two producers 
(original market) 
Market with three 
producers 
(after first divestment) 
Market with four producers 
 (after second divestment) 









































































































































































































































































N  MC TC 2*N  2* TC  N MC TC  3*N  3*TC N MC  TC  4* N  4*TC
0  0 0 0  0  0 00 0 0 0 00  0 0
1  1 1 2 2  1 22 36      
2  5 6 4  12         1 33  4 12
3  9 15  6  30  2 81 0 6 30       
4  16 31  8  62         2 12 15  8 60
5  24 55 10 110  3 18 28 98 4       
6  35 90 12  180  4 32 60 12 180 3 30 45  12 180
7  45 135  14 270  5 50 110 15 330       
8  60 195  16  390         4 55 100  16 400
9  80 275  18  550  6 70 180 18 540       
10  90 365  20  730         5 85 185  20 740
11  115 480  22 960  7 100 280 21 840       
12  130 610  24  1220  8 130 410 24 1230 6 120 305  24 1220
13  160 770  26 1540 9             
14  180 950  28  1900  160 570 27 1710 7 170 475  28 1900
15  210 1160  30  2320  10 200 770 30 2310       
16  230 1390  32  2780         8 220 695  32 2780
17  260 1650  34 3300  11 240 1010 33 3030       
18  300 1950  36  3900  12 290 1300 36 3900 9 280 975  36 3900
19  330 2280  38 4560  13 340 1640 39 4920       
20  360 2640  40  5280         10 345 1320  40 5280
21  410 3050  42  6100  14 390 2030 42 6090       
22  430 3480  44  6960         11 420 1740  44 6960
23  490 3970  46 7940  15 450 2480 45 7440       
24  520 4490  48  8980  16 510 2990 48 8970 12 500 2240  48 8960
25  560 5050  50 10100  17 580 3570 51 10710       
26  620 5670  52  11340         13 590 2830  52 11320
27  660 6330  54  12660  18 650 4220 54 12660       
28  710 7040  56  14080         14 690 3520  56 14080
29  760 7800  58 15600  19 720 4940 57 14820       
30  810 8610  60  17220  20 800 5740 60 17220 15 790 4310  60 17240Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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31  870 9480  62 18960  21 880 6620 63 19860       
32  920 10400  64  20800         16 890 5200  64 20800
33  1000 11400  66  22800  22 970 7590 66 22770       
34  1050 12450  68  24900        17 1010 6210  68 24840
35  1100 13550  70 27100  23 1060 8650 69 25950       
36  1150 14700  72  29400  24 1150 9800 72 29400 18 1140 7350  72 29400
37  1230 15930  74 31860  25 1250 11050 75 33150       
38  1320 17250  76  34500        19 1270 8620  76 34480
39  1350 18600  78  37200  26 1350 12400 78 37200       
40  1450 20050  80  40100        20 1380 10000  80 40000
41  1500 21550  82 43100  27 1450 13850 81 41550       
42  1600 23150  84  46300  28 1600 15450 84 46350 21 1550 11550  84 46200
43  1650 24800  86 49600  29 1650 17100 87 51300       
44  1750 26550  88  53100        22 1700 13250  88 53000
45  1800 28350  90  56700  30 1800 18900 90 56700       
46  1900 30250  92  60500         23 1900 15150  92 60600
47  2000 32250  94  64500  31 1950 20850 93 62550       
48  2050 34300  96  68600  32 2050 22900 96 68700 24 2000 17150  96 68600
A2. Robustness tests 
A2.1 Alternate statistical tests 
As robustness tests, we ran one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, as in LeCoq and Orzen (2006), for our 
hypotheses on quantity, efficiency and productive efficiency.  
Table 13 shows the result of the robustness tests on quantity. Overall they confirm our findings in the 
main test with two exceptions. The relationship q(M4)>q(M3) is not significant anymore (p-
value=0.154), but barely so. The relationship q(M2F)>q(M3) has a lower p-value and thus is 
significant (p-value= 0.086). 
Table 13: Test results quantity hypotheses 
  One-sided two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
Hq.1 - Markets with 3 producers  q(M3F) > q(M3)***
(p< 0.001) 




  N= 22  N= 22  N= 22 
      
Hq.2 - Markets with 2 producers  q(M2F) > q(M2)** 
(p= 0.01275 
) 
q(M3) > q(M2)** 
(p=0.012) 
 
q(M2F) > q(M3)* 
(p=0.070) 
Number of observations  N= 22  N= 22  N= 22 
      
Hq.3 q(M4)  >  q(M2F) 
(p=0.794) 
  
 N=  22     
Table 14 shows the result of the robustness tests on efficiency. Overall they confirm our findings in 
the main test; all relationships have the same levels of significance (0.1, 0.05, or 0.01) as in the main 
test. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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Table 14: Test results for HΩ.1, HΩ.2 and HΩ.3 
  One-sided two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
HΩ.1 - Markets with 3 producers  Ω(M3F) > 
Ω(M3)*** 
(p= 0.002) 







Number of observations  N= 22  N= 22  N= 22 
      
HΩ.2 - Markets with 2 producers  Ω(M2F) > Ω(M2)* 
(p=0.079) 







Number of observations  N= 22  N= 22  N= 22 
      
HΩ.3  Ω(M4) > Ω(M2F) 
(p=0.603) 
  
Number of observations  N= 22    
Table 15 shows the result of the robustness tests on production efficiency. Overall they confirm our 
findings in the main test with one exception: The relationship Φ(M4) < Φ(M3)* has a slightly higher 
p-value and thus is no longer significant (p-value= 0.100), but barely so. 
Table 15: Test results for HΦ.1 and HΦ.2 
  One-sided two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test 
HΦ.1 – Markets with 3 producers  Φ(M4) < Φ(M3) 
(p=0.100) 
Φ(M3F) < Φ(M3) 
(p= 0.859) 
Number of observations  N= 22  N= 22 
    
HΦ.2– Markets with 2 producers   Φ(M3) < Φ(M2)** 
(p=0.041) 
Φ(M2F) < Φ(M2)* 
(p=0.079) 
Number of observations  N= 22  N= 22 
Notably, the robustness tests confirm the results we found in the main tests, and suggest that 
introducing a forward market may have also a stronger effect on competition than adding one more 
competitor in markets with two competitors. 
A2.2 Comparability data without costs 
We ran treatments for markets with two producers without costs to allow comparisons with an earlier 
experiment on the effect of forward markets by LeCoq and Orzen (2006). Table 16 shows the 
theoretical predictions for these cases. Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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ti q   – 16 –  – 
ti q  25  30  37  18/  19
30 
t q   50 60 74 37 
t p   650 380  2  1001 
Prod. S.  32500  22800 148 37037 
Cons. S. 33075  47790  72927  17982 
Total S. 65575  70590  73075  55019 
Eff. (%)  89.74  96.60 100 75.29 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of total (aggregate) quantities sold per period, averaged over groups. The 
treatments without forward markets are represented by open rounds, the treatments with forward 
markets by filled rounds. Like all other treatments, the aggregate productions starts out rather low,31 
and then quickly jump up in the direction of the Nash-equilibrium. Between round 10 and 12 behavior 
stabilizes. 

















                                                      
30  One generator produces 18 units, the other 19 units. 
31  We believe this might be a primer effect of the instructions, which presented examples with rather low numbers to 
facilitate understanding of the basic relationships. Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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Averages by group 
Table 17 shows that aggregate production tends to be significantly (p-values<0.093) smaller than the 
Nash-equilibrium, confirming results of LeCoq and Orzen (2006).  
Table 17: Production Averages and comparison 
Averages 
 M2zc  M2Fzc 




% of NE prediction  79.9%  83.8% 
Number of observations  N=11  N=11 
% of NE prediction 
 LeCoq and Orzen (2006)
32 
91% 95% 
Using a one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test we find that the increase in aggregate production due to a 
forward market is significant (p-value=0.014), confirming results of LeCoq and Orzen (2006). A 
robustness tests confirms this finding.  





  M2Fzc> M2zc** 
(p=0.014) 




OLS regression with 
correction for clustering on 
group level, followed by 
one-sided F test on equality 
of the coefficients 
  M2Fzc> M2zc*** 
(p<0.010) 
   N= 572 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of efficiency per period, averaged over groups. The treatments without 
forward markets are represented by open rounds, the treatments with forward markets by filled rounds. 
As producers have no production costs, production efficiency as defined in the main text is always 
100%. Efficiency is thus determined by the aggregate production and the average efficiency in Figure 
4 thus closely follows the aggregate average production (Figure 4). 
                                                      
32  The averages by Huck et al. (2004) are based on a meta-analysis of 19 experiments with Cournot competition. A 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that our results are not significantly different from their results (all p-values > 0.327). 
The percentage of the Nash-equilibrium prediction we found in condition M3F is significantly higher than the percentage 
Brandts et al. (2008) found (p<0.0425).  Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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Efficiency is lower than the Nash-equilibrium prediction. A two-sided Wilcoxon one-sample signed-
rank tests indicates that these differences are significant (p-values<0.017). 
Table 19: Efficiency averages and comparison 
 M2zc  M2Fzc 






% of NE prediction  89.8%  90.7% 
 N= 11 N= 11 
one-sided Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test 
  M2Fzc> M2zc*** 
 (p<0.010) 
   N= 16 
OLS regression with 
correction for clustering 
on group level, followed 
by one-sided F test on 
equality of the 
coefficients 
  M2Fzc> M2zc** 
 (p=0.011) 
 N= 572 N= 572 Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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A3. Predictions of the spot market price by our automated traders 































0  49.4 667   33  71.4 73   66  93.4 0
1  50.0 649   34  72.0 55   67  94.0 0
2  50.7 631   35  72.7 37   68  94.7 0
3  51.4 613   36  73.4 19   69  95.4 0
4  52.0 595   37  74.0 1   70  96.0 0
5  52.7 577   38  74.7 0   71  96.7 0
6  53.4 559   39  75.4 0   72  97.4 0
7  54.0 541   40  76.0 0   73  98.0 0
8  54.7 523   41  76.7 0   74  98.7 0
9  55.4 505   42  77.4 0   75  99.4 0
10  56.0 487   43  78.0 0   76  100.0 0
11  56.7 469   44  78.7 0   77  100.7 0
12  57.4 451   45  79.4 0   78  101.4 0
13  58.0 433   46  80.0 0   79  102.0 0
14  58.7 415   47  80.7 0   80  102.7 0
15  59.4 397   48  81.4 0   81  103.4 0
16  60.0 379   49  82.0 0   82  104.0 0
17  60.7 361   50  82.7 0   83  104.7 0
18  61.4 343   51  83.4 0   84  105.4 0
19  62.0 325   52  84.0 0   85  106.0 0
20  62.7 307   53  84.7 0   86  106.7 0
21  63.4 289   54  85.4 0   87  107.4 0
22  64.0 271   55  86.0 0   88  108.0 0
23  64.7 253   56  86.7 0   89  108.7 0
24  65.4 235   57  87.4 0   90  109.4 0
25  66.0 217   58  88.0 0   91  110.0 0
26  66.7 199   59  88.7 0   92  110.7 0
27  67.4 181   60  89.4 0   93  111.4 0
28  68.0 163   61  90.0 0   94  112.0 0
29  68.7 145   62  90.7 0   95  112.7 0
30  69.4 127   63  91.4 0   96  113.4 0
31  70.0 109   64  92.0 0      
32  70.7 91   65  92.7 0        Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
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0  40.0  921   33  47.3  723    66  66.0  218 
1  40.2 915    34  47.5 717    67  67.0 191 
2  40.4  909   35  47.7  711    68  68.0  164 
3  40.6 903    36  48.0 705    69  69.0 137 
4  40.9  897   37  48.2  699    70  70.0  110 
5  41.1 890    38  48.4 693    71  71.0 83 
6  41.3  884   39  48.6  688    72  72.0  56 
7  41.6 878    40  48.8 682    73  73.0 29 
8  41.8  872   41  49.0  676    74  74.0  2 
9  42.0 866    42  49.3 670    75  75.0 0 
10  42.2  860   43  49.5  664    76  76.0  0 
11  42.5 854    44  49.7 659    77  77.0 0 
12  42.7  848   45  49.9  653    78  78.0  0 
13  42.9 842    46  50.1 647    79  79.0 0 
14  43.1  836   47  50.3  641    80  80.0  0 
15  43.3 830    48  50.5 636    81  81.0 0 
16  43.6  824   49  50.7  630    82  82.0  0 
17  43.8 818    50  51.0 624    83  83.0 0 
18  44.0  812   51  51.2  619    84  84.0  0 
19  44.2 806    52  52.0 596    85  85.0 0 
20  44.5  800   53  53.0  569    86  86.0  0 
21  44.7 794    54  54.0 542    87  87.0 0 
22  44.9  788   55  55.0  515    88  88.0  0 
23  45.1 782    56  56.0 488    89  89.0 0 
24  45.3  776   57  57.0  461    90  90.0  0 
25  45.6 770    58  58.0 434    91  91.0 0 
26  45.8  764   59  59.0  407    92  92.0  0 
27  46.0 758    60  60.0 380    93  93.0 0 
28  46.2  752   61  61.0  353    94  94.0  0 
29  46.4 746    62  62.0 326    95  95.0 0 
30  46.7  740   63  63.0  299    96  96.0  0 
31  46.9 734    64  64.0 272       
32  47.1  728   65  65.0  245         
 Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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0  43.2  833    33  48.4  693    66  66.0  218 
1 43.4  829    34  48.6  688    67 67.0  191 
2  43.5  824   35  48.7  684    68  68.0  164 
3 43.7  820    36  48.9  680    69 69.0  137 
4  43.9  816   37  49.0  676    70  70.0  110 
5 44.0  811    38  49.2  672    71 71.0  83 
6  44.2  807   39  49.3  668    72  72.0  56 
7 44.3  803    40  49.5  663    73 73.0  29 
8  44.5  799   41  49.7  659    74  74.0  2 
9 44.7  794    42  49.8  655    75 75.0  0 
10  44.8  790   43  50.0  651    76  76.0  0 
11 45.0  786    44  50.1  647    77 77.0  0 
12  45.1  781   45  50.3  643    78  78.0  0 
13 45.3  777    46  50.4  639    79 79.0  0 
14  45.5  773   47  50.6  635    80  80.0  0 
15 45.6  769    48  50.7  630    81 81.0  0 
16  45.8  764   49  50.9  626    82  82.0  0 
17 45.9  760    50  51.0  622    83 83.0  0 
18  46.1  756   51  51.2  618    84  84.0  0 
19 46.2  752    52  52.0  596    85 85.0  0 
20  46.4  747   53  53.0  569    86  86.0  0 
21 46.6  743    54  54.0  542    87 87.0  0 
22  46.7  739   55  55.0  515    88  88.0  0 
23 46.9  735    56  56.0  488    89 89.0  0 
24  47.0  730   57  57.0  461    90  90.0  0 
25 47.2  726    58  58.0  434    91 91.0  0 
26  47.3  722   59  59.0  407    92  92.0  0 
27 47.5  718    60  60.0  380    93 93.0  0 
28  47.6  713   61  61.0  353    94  94.0  0 
29 47.8  709    62  62.0  326    95 95.0  0 
30  48.0  705   63  63.0  299    96  96.0  0 
31 48.1  701    64  64.0  272       
32  48.3  697   65  65.0  245         
 Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets 
29 
A4. Sheets given to the subjects 
(M2, M2zc, M3, M4) 
Total Production and Resulting Price 
Production  Price/Unit   Production  Price/Unit   Production  Price/Unit 
0  2000  33 1109 66 218
1 1973  34 1082 67 191
2  1946  35 1055 68 164
3 1919  36 1028 69 137
4  1892  37 1001 70 110
5 1865  38 974 71 83
6  1838  39 947 72 56
7 1811  40 920 73 29
8  1784  41 893 74 2
9 1757  42 866 75 0
10  1730  43 839 76 0
11 1703  44 812 77 0
12  1676  45 785 78 0
13 1649  46 758 79 0
14  1622  47 731 80 0
15 1595  48 704 81 0
16  1568  49 677 82 0
17 1541  50 650 83 0
18  1514  51 623 84 0
19 1487  52 596 85 0
20  1460  53 569 86 0
21 1433  54 542 87 0
22  1406  55 515 88 0
23 1379  56 488 89 0
24  1352  57 461 90 0
25 1325  58 434 91 0
26  1298  59 407 92 0
27 1271  60 380 93 0
28  1244  61 353 94 0
29 1217  62 326 95 0
30  1190  63 299 96 0
31 1163  64 272
32  1136  65 245Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
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(M2F, M2Fzc, M3F) 
Aggregate Production and Resulting Price in STAGE B 
Aggregate 
number of Units 






Units in Stage 











0  2000  33 1109 66 218
1 1973  34 1082 67 191
2  1946  35 1055 68 164
3 1919  36 1028 69 137
4  1892  37 1001 70 110
5 1865  38 974 71 83
6  1838  39 947 72 56
7 1811  40 920 73 29
8  1784  41 893 74 2
9 1757  42 866 75 0
10  1730  43 839 76 0
11 1703  44 812 77 0
12  1676  45 785 78 0
13 1649  46 758 79 0
14  1622  47 731 80 0
15 1595  48 704 81 0
16  1568  49 677 82 0
17 1541  50 650 83 0
18  1514  51 623 84 0
19 1487  52 596 85 0
20  1460  53 569 86 0
21 1433  54 542 87 0
22  1406  55 515 88 0
23 1379  56 488 89 0
24  1352  57 461 90 0
25 1325  58 434 91 0
26  1298  59 407 92 0
27 1271  60 380 93 0
28  1244  61 353 94 0
29 1217  62 326 95 0
30  1190  63 299 96 0
31 1163  64 272
32  1136  65 245
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(M3F) 
















0  833   33  693    66  218 
1  829   34  688    67  191 
2  824   35  684    68  164 
3  820   36  680    69  137 
4  816   37  676    70  110 
5  811   38  672    71  83 
6  807   39  668    72  56 
7  803   40  663    73  29 
8  799   41  659    74  2 
9  794   42  655    75  0 
10  790   43  651    76  0 
11  786   44  647    77  0 
12  781   45  643    78  0 
13  777   46  639    79  0 
14  773   47  635    80  0 
15  769   48  630    81  0 
16  764   49  626    82  0 
17  760   50  622    83  0 
18  756   51  618    84  0 
19  752   52  596    85  0 
20  747   53  569    86  0 
21  743   54  542    87  0 
22  739   55  515    88  0 
23  735   56  488    89  0 
24  730   57  461    90  0 
25  726   58  434    91  0 
26  722   59  407    92  0 
27  718   60  380    93  0 
28  713   61  353    94  0 
29  709   62  326    95  0 
30  705   63  299    96  0 
31  701   64  272      
32  697   65  245       
 Silvester van Koten and Andreas Ortmann 
32 
(M2F) 
















0  921    33  723    66  218 
1  915    34  717    67  191 
2  909    35  711    68  164 
3  903    36  705    69  137 
4  897    37  699    70  110 
5  890    38  693    71  83 
6  884    39  688    72  56 
7  878    40  682    73  29 
8  872    41  676    74  2 
9  866    42  670    75  0 
10  860    43  664    76  0 
11  854    44  659    77  0 
12  848    45  653    78  0 
13  842    46  647    79  0 
14  836    47  641    80  0 
15  830    48  636    81  0 
16  824    49  630    82  0 
17  818    50  624    83  0 
18  812    51  619    84  0 
19  806    52  596    85  0 
20  800    53  569    86  0 
21  794    54  542    87  0 
22  788    55  515    88  0 
23  782    56  488    89  0 
24  776    57  461    90  0 
25  770    58  434    91  0 
26  764    59  407    92  0 
27  758    60  380    93  0 
28  752    61  353    94  0 
29  746    62  326    95  0 
30  740    63  299    96  0 
31  734    64  272      
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0  667   33  73   66  0
1  649   34  55   67  0
2  631   35  37   68  0
3  613   36  19   69  0
4  595   37  1   70  0
5  577   38  0   71  0
6  559   39  0   72  0
7  541   40  0   73  0
8  523   41  0   74  0
9  505   42  0   75  0
10  487   43  0   76  0
11  469   44  0   77  0
12  451   45  0   78  0
13  433   46  0   79  0
14  415   47  0   80  0
15  397   48  0   81  0
16  379   49  0   82  0
17  361   50  0   83  0
18  343   51  0   84  0
19  325   52  0   85  0
20  307   53  0   86  0
21  289   54  0   87  0
22  271   55  0   88  0
23  253   56  0   89  0
24  235   57  0   90  0
25  217   58  0   91  0
26  199   59  0   92  0
27  181   60  0   93  0
28  163   61  0   94  0
29  145   62  0   95  0
30  127   63  0   96  0
31  109   64  0     
















1  1 1 25  560 5050
2  5  6 26  620  5670
3  9 15 27  660 6330
4  16  31 28  710  7040
5  24 55 29  760 7800
6  35  90 30  810  8610
7  45 135 31  870 9480
8  60  195 32  920  10400
9  80 275 33  1000 11400
10  90  365 34  1050  12450
11  115 480 35  1100 13550
12  130  610 36  1150  14700
13  160 770 37  1230 15930
14  180  950 38  1320  17250
15  210 1160 39  1350 18600
16  230  1390 40  1450  20050
17  260 1650 41  1500 21550
18  300  1950 42  1600  23150
19  330 2280 43  1650 24800
20  360  2640 44  1750  26550
21  410 3050 45  1800 28350
22  430  3480 46  1900  30250
23  490 3970 47  2000 32250
24  520  4490 48  2050  34300
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22  970 7590
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24  1150 9800
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27 1450 13850
28  1600 15450
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30  1800 18900
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6  120 305
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8  220 695
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11 420 1740
12  500 2240
13 590 2830
14  690 3520
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16  890 5200
17 1010 6210
18  1140 7350
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20  1380 10000
21 1550 11550
22  1700 13250
23 1900 15150
24  2000 17150
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